Yeah, you wish.
I thought you knew...
stealthPRIVATE is fundamentally private.
It uses Orchard zk-SNARKs with Halo 2 proofs. Every transaction is fully shielded — sender, recipient, and amount are all hidden. There is no way to construct a rich list because nobody knows who holds what.
Not us. Not the stakers. Not anyone running a node. Not the block explorer you're looking at right now.
Sender Hidden
Recipient Hidden
Amount Hidden
Balances Hidden
| Rank | Address | Balance (XSS) | % Supply |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | xss1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq | ████████.██████ | ██.██% |
| 2 | xss1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq | ████████.██████ | ██.██% |
| 3 | xss1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq | ████████.██████ | ██.██% |
| 4 | xss1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq | ████████.██████ | ██.██% |
| 5 | xss1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqq | ████████.██████ | ██.██% |
But it's like: Hey! You can look, but you can't see.
Why There Is No Rich List
AddressesOne-time shielded addresses — not reusable, not linkable
BalancesEncrypted inside zk-SNARK commitments — only the owner can decrypt
TransactionsZero-knowledge proofs verify validity without revealing any details
Node operatorsVerify proofs, not data — they never see amounts or addresses
Why zk-SNARKs are superior to Ring Signatures
Ring signatures hide the sender among a set of decoys. zk-SNARKs prove a transaction is valid without revealing anything. Here's why that matters.
| Property | Ring Signatures (Monero) | zk-SNARKs / Halo 2 (stealthPRIVATE) |
|---|---|---|
| Sender privacy | Hidden among decoys — plausible deniability, not mathematical certainty | Mathematically proven hidden — zero information leaked |
| Recipient privacy | Stealth addresses (one-time keys) | Encrypted in the proof — never appears on-chain |
| Amount privacy | Pedersen commitments (RingCT) — added later | Native to the proof — amounts never exist in cleartext |
| Anonymity set | Ring size of 16 decoys per transaction | The entire shielded pool — every note is indistinguishable |
| Traceability risk | Statistical analysis can narrow down the real spend over time | No statistical leakage — outputs are commitments, not visible UTXOs |
| Rich list possible? | Difficult but theoretically attackable via spend-pattern analysis | Impossible — balances are encrypted, addresses are one-time |
| Trusted setup | Not required | Not required — Halo 2 eliminates trusted setup entirely |
| Tx size | ~2 KB (grows with ring size) | ~1 KB (constant, regardless of anonymity set size) |
| Selective disclosure | View keys reveal incoming transactions only | Viewing keys + per-payment disclosure via outgoing viewing key |
The core differenceRing signatures hide you in a crowd of 16. zk-SNARKs make the crowd irrelevant — there is nothing to find.
Monero's limitationDecoys are selected from visible on-chain outputs. Timing analysis, output age heuristics, and poisoned decoy sets can reduce effective anonymity well below the nominal ring size.
stealthPRIVATE's approachOrchard zk-SNARKs with Halo 2 recursive proofs. No trusted setup, no decoy selection, no statistical leakage. Every shielded note is indistinguishable from every other.
But what if I need to prove my balance?
Viewing KeyShare your viewing key to grant read-only access to your transactions
Payment DisclosureProve a specific payment was made without exposing your full history
Privacy is the default. Transparency is opt-in.